We combine roll call votes and referendum decisions on identically worded legislative proposals to identify the effect of electoral rules on the way Swiss Members of Parliament (MPs) represent their constituents' preferences. We exploit the fact that MPs in both Houses of Parliament are elected in the same electoral districts (the cantons). Yet, in the Lower House, MPs are elected using a proportional rule, while in the Upper House they are elected employing a majoritarian rule. We find that electoral rules matter strongly for political representation.
INTRODUCTION
There is a vast formal theoretical literature on how electoral rules influence the way individual politicians represent their voters' preferences (see, e.g., Austen-Smith 2000, Austen-Smith and Banks 2000 Banks , 2005 . Unfortunately, it is not simple to empirically test these theoretical predictions. One important difficulty is that, while politicians' decisions on a certain issue are usually observable (e.g. in roll call votes), voters' preferences must be indirectly inferred from general elections and/or opinion surveys. Moreover, it is often the case that citizens do not exactly choose between the same alternatives as their political representatives face when voting for a legislative proposal (see, e.g., Lax and Phillips 2009) . Surveys employed to infer citizen's preferences rarely ask respondents about a specific issue in exactly the same way as it will be framed in a legislative proposal.
In order to overcome these problems, combining roll call votes and referendum decisions on identical issues is gaining growing interest in the literature (see, e.g., Gerber and Lewis 2004 , Matsusaka 2010 , 2017 , Portmann et al. 2012 , Hug and Martin 2012 , Carey and Hix 2013 , Brunner et al. 2013 , Potrafke 2013 , Giger and Klüver 2016 , Barceló 2018 , Stadelmann et al. 2017 . Following this approach, we combine roll call votes and referendum decisions in Switzerland to empirically investigate the role of electoral rules on the way politicians represent their constituents' preferences. Specifically, we exploit the fact that in the Swiss Lower House MPs are elected using a proportional rule, while in the Swiss Upper House MPs are elected employing a majoritarian rule.
Several institutional features of Switzerland coalesce to offer a rare opportunity to isolate the effect of electoral rules on the connection between politicians' choices and voters' preferences.
First, MPs for both Swiss Houses are elected in the same electoral districts, namely, the cantons. As a consequence, candidates for both Houses face exactly the same constituency.
Second, there are many referenda in which Swiss voters cast their ballot to decide on a variety of issues, thereby revealing their preferences for specific policies. Moreover, referendum decisions are binding. Third, before each referendum, MPs from both Houses of Parliament vote on the matter. Crucially, MPs in parliament and voters in the referendum vote on identically-worded legislative proposals (see Portmann 2014 or Giger and Klüver 2016) . These institutional features allow us to merge roll call votes and referendum decisions to identify the effect of voters' preferences on the probability that an MP votes "yes" under a proportional and majoritarian electoral rule.
We estimate the effect of the share of voters in an electoral district (Swiss canton) that vote "yes" in a referendum on the probability that an MP from each House votes "yes" on the identical legislative proposal. In accordance with the literature (see, e.g., Lijphart 1994 , Cox 1997 , we hypothesize that when MPs are elected using a proportion electoral rule, centrifugal forces prevail and the proportion of MPs of a district accepting (rejecting) a given proposal is approximately the same as the proportion of voters willing to accept (reject) the proposal (see Cox 1990) 1 , while when MPs are elected using a majoritarian electoral rule, the MPs of a district will accept (reject) a proposal whenever a majority of the voters of the district are willing to accept (reject) the proposal (see Downs 1957) 2 . Thus, the probability that a proportional-elected MP votes "yes" is hypothesized to be linear in the share of voters voting "yes", while the probability that a majority-elected MP votes "yes" as a function of the share of voters voting "yes" follows an S-shape form with an inflection point at 50%. We provide a theoretical model of legislative elections and political representation that formally generates these results and substantiates the hypotheses.
Our empirical results show that electoral rules matter, and the voting patterns of voters and
MPs closely correspond to our hypotheses. For the Lower House, where politicians are elected using a proportional rule, the probability that an MP votes "yes" follows the share of voters that vote "yes" in the referendum. In contrast, for the Upper House, where politicians are elected using a majoritarian rule, the probability that an MP accepts a proposal evinces a steep when the share of voters voting "yes" in the 35-65% range, i.e., relatively close to the 50% threshold. Moreover, the estimated probability that an MP votes "yes" as a function of the share of voters voting "yes" has an S-shape form with an inflection point close to 50%. These results are fully in line with theoretical predictions.
In order to corroborate our results, we perform numerous robustness checks. We show that when we restrict the sample to districts where only one or two MPs are elected for the Lower House, the estimations for proportional-elected MPs approach those for majoritarian-elected MPs. We check that our results persist if we only focus on those districts in which the majority of the voters is aligned with the nation as a whole. We also perform a Kolmogorow-Smirnow test for the equality of the distributions of the estimated probability that an MP votes "yes" for proportional-elected MPs and majoritarian-elected MPs. The test always rejects the equality of distributions implied by proportional and majoritarian rules. Finally, we compare our estimations for each electoral rule with ideal theoretical predictions. For proportional-elected MPs, empirical marginal effects are close to theoretical ideal marginal effects. A one percent point change in the share of voters who votes "yes" in the referendum is associated with a one percent point change in the probability that an MP of the district in the Lower House also votes "yes" in the same legislative proposal. For MPs in the Upper House, who are elected using a majoritarian rule, empirical marginal effects are smoother than the sharp theoretical marginal effects. Nevertheless, in line with theoretical predictions, only when the share of voters voting "yes" in the referendum approaches 50%, the association between the share of voters who votes "yes" and the probability that an Upper House MP votes "yes" becomes statistically significant and politically relevant.
Our paper is related to two strands of literatures. First, there is a theoretical and empirical literature on legislative elections (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1988 , Austen-Smith 1996 , Myerson 1999 , Baron and Diermeier 2001 , Grofman 2004 , Schofield and Sened 2006 . At the theoretical level, our model captures the idea that in a proportional electoral system, unlike a majoritarian one, the distribution of politicians' preferences approximately reproduces the distribution of voters' preferences (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 2005, chapter 9). At the empirical level, our results contribute to this literature providing a stringent test of the role of electoral rules on political representation of voters' preferences 3 .
Second, and closer to our work, is the more recent literature on electoral rules and congruence between representatives' choices and voters' preferences (see, among others, Blais and Bodet 2006 , Budge and McDonald 2007 , Powell 2000 , 2009 , Powell and Vanberg 2000 , Golder and Stramski 2010 , Dow 2011 , Maaser and Stratmann 2018 4 . For Switzerland, Hug and Martin (2012) and Portmann et al. (2012) study positions of Lower House members and show that members from single-member or smaller districts are on average closer to their respective median voter. However, Carey and Hix (2013) qualify these results and suggest a nonmonotonic relationship between district magnitude and median voter representation.
3 A growing literature does not directly look at political representation but at effects of electoral rules on redistribution and fiscal policy. Majority rule -as opposed to proportional representation -is usually shown be associated with more targeted redistribution and less public goods (e.g., Lizzeri and Persico 2001 or Funk and Gathmann 2013) . Gagliarducci et al. (2011) provide micro evidence that majoritarian representatives target their constituency with the bills that they put forward. 4 Golder and Ferland (2018) provide an excellent review of the literature on the link between electoral rules and congruence. Stadelmann et al. (2017) institutions, and introduces our data and empirical model. Section IV presents the estimations and main empirical results. Finally, Section V discusses some of the implications of our results for the debate on ideological congruence and the design of electoral systems.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We begin developing a simple model that stresses the main institutional difference between the Swiss Lower and Upper House; namely, the electoral rules. We use the model to predict the political congruence between legislators and voters in each legislative branch.
Consider an electoral district inhabited by voters, divided -without loss of generality -in two groups with different preferences over a collective decision . Let ( ) = −� − � and This implies that in the Lower House a proportion of the seats of the district will be occupied by -representatives, while a proportion 1 − will be occupied byrepresentatives. Moreover, the proportion of Lower House representatives of a district that accept (reject) a proposal will coincide with the proportion of voters in the district that would be happy accepting (rejecting) the proposal. For example, if < < and ∈ � , 2 − �, then a proportion of voters and MPs of the district will vote "yes", and a proportion of voters and MPs of the district will vote "no". Alternatively, we can interpret that the probability an individual Lower House MP votes "yes" is given by the share of voters voting "yes".
6 Similarly, if < , then the -representative will accept any proposal ∈ �2 − , �. 7 Similarly, if > , then the -representative will accept any proposal ∈ �2 − , �.
In the Upper House, if > 1/2, then all the seats of the district will be taken byrepresentatives, while if < 1/2, all the seats of the district will be taken byrepresentatives. Finally, if = 1/2, each party will obtain all the seats with probability 1/2.
This directly implies that when > 1/2 or = 1/2 and all the seats end in the hands of party ( < 1/2 or = 1/2 and all the seats end in the hands of party ) the decision made by the district representatives in the Upper House will be at least aligned with what left-wing (right-wing) voters in the district would prefer to do. Thus, it is the case that the decision made by the district representatives in the Upper House will be always aligned with the preferences of a majority of the voters in the district. Alternatively, we can interpret that the probability that an individual Upper House MP votes "yes" is either 0 or 1 with an inflection point at 1/2.
The implications of this electoral model are straightforward: If representatives are elected using a proportional electoral rule, the proportion of representatives of a district accepting (rejecting) a given proposal is identical to the proportion of voters willing to accept (reject) the proposal.
If representatives are elected using a majoritarian electoral rule, representatives of a district will accept (reject) a proposal whenever a majority of the voters of the district are willing to accept (reject) the proposal 8 .
In the Supplementary Material, we extend the analysis to two policy dimensions as well as multiple voter groups and parties. Overall, we obtain analogous results for each electoral rule.
III. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL

Institutional Setting
Switzerland's constitution of 1848 was influenced by similar ideas as the United States
Constitution. It has a bicameral parliament comprised of a Lower House (National Council, "Nationalrat" in German) and an Upper House (Council of States, "Ständerat" in German).
Members of both Houses decide on exactly the same laws and constitutional amendments and 8 These predictions are in line with intuitive reasoning regarding representation in different electoral system: Centrifugal forces play a larger role for the proportional rule and representatives may focus on all voter groups over the electoral spectrum by representing positions at odds with the center of the distribution of their electoral district. In contrast, centripetal forces affect representation of voters by majority elected representatives as they have to gain a voter majority to be elected (see Cox 1990 , Downs 1957 , Duverger 1954 , Lijphart 1994 , Myerson 1999 Apart from the electoral system, formal election requirements and prerogatives in the two Houses are identical (see Portmann 2014) .
The difference in the electoral systems suggests that the proportionally elected members of the Lower House will be more prone to focus on all voter groups across the electoral spectrum, while the majority elected members of the Upper House will cater for district median voters.
These incentives inherent in the electoral systems coincide with the roles stipulated in the Swiss 9 More-proportional systems tend have a ratio of seat share for parties to vote shares for parties closer to 1 (see Section II or Taagepra and Shugart 1989 , Lijphart 1994 , Cox 1997 . Thus, it is sensible associate more representatives with more proportionality as is the case for Switzerland. Thus, everything that impacts voters' decisions such as party cues or campaigning does void comparisons between the two Houses such that differences in political representation due to electoral systems can be identified.
Finally, referendum decisions present measures of revealed preferences for policies as they permit voters to judge legislative proposals and rank them against the status quo (see, among others, Noam 1980 , Schneider et al. 1981 , Frey 1994 , Matsusaka 2010 . Combining referendum decisions with those of MPs is a natural way of evaluating politicians' behavior relative to their voters' preferences (see Brunner et al. 2013 , Giger and Klüver 2016 , Barceló 2018 , Matsusaka 2017 ).
Dataset
Our dataset consists of 58 referenda and the corresponding legislative proposals by proportional-elected MPs in the Lower House and majority-elected MPs in the Upper House.
Referendum decisions took place between 2008 and 2014 and the corresponding parliamentary decisions were carried out during 2007 and 2014. Our dataset starts with the first legislative decision registered on camera which was subject to a referendum. All roll calls are recorded but our sample is naturally restricted to those legislative decisions which are also presented to 13 Understanding the black box of how politicians' ability and willingness to predict voters' preferences has started with Erikson et al. (1975) and is still subjects of research today (see, e.g., Huder et al. 2011 , Fisher and Herrick 2013 , Butler et al. 2017 .
the electorate in a referendum. For the period of analysis, we include the whole universe of referenda. For constitutional proposals we also observe the universe of final roll calls. The legislative proposals in our dataset include a broad range of topics covering social, economic, health, gender, family, migration and cultural issues.
The number of individual MPs serving in the Lower House during the sample period was 358.
Overall, they made a total of 10,581 individual decisions 14 . In the Upper House, there were 85
MPs who carried out a total of 2,214 individual decisions. Thus, the total number of individual legislative decisions with corresponding referenda is high, which allows a precise and reliable statistical analysis. Although, we can only include decisions in our sample on which MPs and voters cast ballots, because of the permanent threat of a referendum, incentives to represent voters should not significantly vary based on whether a referendum follows a decision in parliament or not. Certainly, the voting sequence does not differentially affect representation incentives for Lower and Upper House MPs.
Our main dependent variable of interest is the decision of proportionally-elected and majorityelected MPs on legislative proposals in Parliament (MP votes yes). This is a binary indicator which takes the value of 1 if an MP accepts a proposal (votes "yes") or 0, if an MP rejects the proposal (votes "no"). Our main independent variable of interest is how voters in the electoral districts of their MPs decide on identically-worded proposals. This variable is measured as the share of voters in the district deciding "yes" (Voter yes share) in the corresponding referendum.
In our sample, the variable Voter yes share lies between a minimum of 8.7% and a maximum of 94.3% of voters accepting referendum.
The sample consists of 31 initiatives, 12 mandatory referenda (including four parliament initiated constitutional counter proposals to initiatives) on constitutional issues initiated by parliament, and 15 facultative referenda on laws proposed by parliament. We control for the type of referendum by including referendum-specific fixed effects in our estimations below.
About 22.6% of initiatives are accepted by Swiss voters with a national average yes share of 39.0%, acceptance of voters of legislative proposals by parliament is 74.1% with a national average yes share of 57.8%. The mean of Voter yes share is 47.5% over the whole sample of observations, while the median value is 46.7%. Thus, the sample of observations is well balanced around the 50% benchmark, which is also the relevant threshold for a referendum to be accepted or rejected.
Empirical Model
Due to the clarity of our institutional setting, the empirical model is straightforward. We estimate a logistic model explaining the dependent variable MP votes yes with the variable
Voter yes share and a control for referendum-specific fixed effects:
The unit of observations is an MP i voting in a referendum r. Λ denotes the logistic function,
i.e., Λ( ) = exp ( )/(1 + exp( )) . The coefficient regulates the impact 15 of the Voter yes share in referendum r on the probability that politician i votes "yes". This coefficient is our main measure of interest. represents referendum-specific fixed effects. Referendum-specific fixed effects take account of all differences between referenda and the corresponding legislative decision including salience, closeness, signature support, referendum type 16 , and any other potentially unobserved factors related to referenda. Voter yes share on the probability of a proportional-elected MP voting "yes" (specifications 1-3) and of majority-elected MPs voting "yes" (specifications 4-6). Specification (2) and (3) as well as (5) and (6) distinguish themselves from specification (1) and (4) only by accounting for district (i.e. canton) and party group fixed effects, respectively 17 .
IV. RESULTS
MPs and Voters under Proportional and Majoritarian Electoral Rules
As the share of voters accepting a referendum increases, both types of MPs are more likely to vote "yes". The coefficient is statistically significant and positive in all the specifications.
The estimated is smaller for proportional-elected MPs than for majority-elected MPs, which influences the effect of changes in Voter yes share on the probabilities that MPs vote "yes". 15 The actual variable Voter yes share is realized in the referendum. Thus, the interpretation of the association is to be in terms of a change in Voter yes share on the corresponding probability of an MP to vote "yes". 16 For initiatives, signatures are collected prior to the vote in parliament. Thus, for initiatives MPs of both Houses have some initial information for potential support. We control for this by including referendum-specific fixedeffects. All initiatives in our sample have been rejected by a majority of MPs in both Houses. 17 Fixed effects estimations do not require assumptions regarding the expected value of the coefficients for the fixed effects and such estimations are consistent even if the true model is a random-effects model (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005) .
The lower part of Table 1 shows the effect of a discrete change from 10% to 90% in the Voter yes share on the probability of MPs voting "yes". For proportional-elected MPs this probability increases by 67-69%-points, while for majority-elected MPs it increases by 98-99%-points.
Thus, an 80%-points increase in the share of voters accepting a referendum in a district is associated to a similar jump in the probability of their proportional-elected representatives to vote "yes", while it is associated with an almost certain yes-vote for their majority-elected representatives. This corresponds closely to our theoretical expectations for each electoral rule.
Also in line with theoretical predictions, a small change in the share of voters accepting a referendum from 47.5 to 52.5% is associated with an increase in the probability to vote "yes" of about 5%-points for proportional-elected MPs, but about 15%-points for majority-elected MPs. The effect of the difference in the estimated under different electoral rules is illustrated in Figure 1 . The figure plots the predictions of the probability of MPs voting "yes" as a function of Voter yes share based on the logistic models (1) and (4), respectively. Figure 1(a) shows that proportional-elected MPs exhibit a probability to vote "yes" that is roughly proportional to Voter yes share. In contrast, the acceptance probability of majority-elected politicians only tends to react to Voter yes share in the 35-65% range, i.e., relatively closer to the 50% threshold.
While the curvature for proportional-elected MPs is almost linear, for majority elected MPs it is S-shaped with an inflection point close to 50%.
In Figure 1(b) , we predict the effect of a 1%-point change in Voter yes share on the probability ) 18 Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to estimate the relationships restricting the sample to only single-member districts with proportional-elected MPs. For those cases, we would expect a total coincidence between the proportional and majoritarian rules.
In the Supplementary Material, we present further robustness checks based on multi-level logistic regressions with random-effects for referenda, districts and parties. All results are not affected (qualitatively or quantitatively) by the choice between random-or fixed-effects.
Moreover, we employ weighting strategies to account for narrow referendum outcomes and our interpretations regarding electoral rules remain unchanged. Similarly, analyzing a subsample of elderly MPs and those that are new to the respective House does not affect observable differences regarding political representation of MPs from the two Houses. Finally, excluding any fixed-and/or random-effects and employing Voter yes share as the single explanatory variable also yields similar results.
Establishing Differences between Proportional and Majoritarian Rules
Next, we provide robust empirical evidence that the impact of Voter yes share is statistically different for the proportional and majoritarian electoral rules. In order to do so, we merge the dataset for proportionally and majority-elected MPs, employ an identifier for proportionalelected MPs and interact this identifier with Voter yes share. Then, the interaction term identifies if proportional-elected MPs have a statistically significantly different than majority elected MPs. For a given value of the intercept, a lower implies a smaller curvature of the predicted probabilities from the logit model. Indeed, we find that is statistically significantly smaller for proportional-elected MPs than for majority-elected MPs (estimations relegated to Supplementary Material). The same holds when we split the sample at the 50% threshold, i.e., when we look at voters rejecting the referendum and voters accepting the referendum, separately. Thus, changes in voters' preferences translate differently into changes in the MPs choices depending on whether MPs are elected by a proportional or a majoritarian rule.
We also perform a Kolmogorow-Smirnow test for the equality of the empirical distributions in Figure 1 (a) (see Supplementary Material). We employ only 100 draws of each distribution, so the test has a relatively high chance of failing to reject the equality of the empirical distributions. Nevertheless, the Kolmogorow-Smirnow test always rejects the equality of distributions implied by proportional and majoritarian rules. This also holds when looking only at the part of the distributions where Voter yes share is below (above) 50%, i.e., when the proportional rule predicts "yes" probabilities above (bellow) the majoritarian rule.
Figure 3: Differences in MPs Predicted Decisions as a Function of Voters Decisions
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the differences between the proportional and the majoritarian rule regarding the prediction of whether an MP votes yes. It plots the empirical differences between the predictions of the two distributions shown Figure 1 (a) which stem from Table 1, columns (1) and (4). It is interesting to note that the inflection point is almost perfectly at the 50% threshold, corresponding to theoretical predictions. Below 50%, the proportional rule predicts a higher probability that an MP votes "yes", while above this threshold the majoritarian rule predicts a higher probability that an MP votes "yes".
Differences between Empirical Distributions and Theoretical Ideal Outcomes
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show theoretical ideal outcomes for each electoral rule and confront them with the corresponding empirical estimations 19 . Under a proportional electoral rule, if MPs are perfectly representing voters' preferences, the probability an MP votes "yes" should be equal to the share of voters agreeing with the legislative proposal in the referendum. Under a majoritarian rule, the theoretical ideal probability that an MP votes "yes" should be zero if less than 50% of the voters agree with the legislative proposal and one if more than 50% of the voters agree with the proposal in the referendum (see Section II). As shown in Figure 4 , although not exactly identical, each empirical estimation tends to approach its ideal benchmark, especially when considering that predictions for Voter yes share below 10% and above 90%
are mostly out of sample. More formally, for proportional-elected MPs, a KolmogorowSmirnow test for the equality between the estimated distribution and the ideal benchmark reveals that equality cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.4740 for 100 draws and p-value = 0.1561 for 1000 draws). On the contrary, for majority-elected MPs, equality of the estimated distribution and its ideal benchmark can be statistically rejected (p-value = 0.000 for 100 draws) 20 .
An alternative way to compare theoretical ideal outcomes with the observed voting patterns is to contrast the empirical marginal effects of voters' decisions on MPs decisions with theoretical ideal marginal effects. In the Supplementary Material, we predict how changes in Voter yes share are associated with changes in the probability of an MP voting "yes" in the respective
Houses. For proportional-elected MPs, empirical marginal effects closely follow theoretical ideal marginal effects. Any percentage point change in Voter yes share is associated with the same quantitative change in the probability of an MP voting "yes". For majoritarian-elected MPs, empirical marginal effects are smoother than theoretical ideal marginal effects.
Nevertheless, in line with theoretical predictions, only when approaching the 50% threshold, the association between Voter yes share and the probability of an MP voting "yes" becomes strong. Finally, we split our sample into three subsets. The first subset considers only observations for which Voter yes share is below 35%; the second subset observations for which Voter yes share is between 35% and 65%, and the third one observations for which Voter yes share is above 65%. For each of these subsets, we estimate our empirical model including referendum fixed effects (see Supplemental Material). In Figure 5 we plot the predictions for the probability of an MP to vote "yes" as a function of Voter yes share for the three subsets of observations. The results are striking and correspond to theoretical predictions. Throughout, the choices of proportional-elected MPs tend to closely correspond in an almost linear way to changes in Voter yes share. On the contrary, majority-elected MPs have a probability of voting "yes" almost equal to zero when analyzing the sample of observations where Voter yes share is below 35% (Figure 5 (a)); they have a probability of voting "yes" very close to one when analyzing the sample of observations where Voter yes share is above 65% (Figure 5 (c)); and their probability of voting "yes" increases continuously if Voter yes share lies between 35 and 65%.
V. DISCUSSION
Electoral rules affect the way individual politicians represent their constituents' preferences.
We hypothesize that the probability that a proportional-elected MP accepts a legislative proposal is linearly associated to the share of voters who support the proposal. The probability that a majority-elected MP accepts a legislative proposal only reacts to the majority of voters who support the proposal. We provide a theoretical model which generates these predictions and empirical evidence on how electoral rules affect the way Swiss Members of Parliament Our results contribute to the debate on ideological congruence. A controversy surrounding electoral systems and voter congruence has attracted attention over the last years and the debate focusses on potential merits of each system regarding ideological congruence (see, e.g., Powell
and Vanberg 2000 , Powell 2009 , Ezrow 2011 , Golder and Ferland 2018 . The proportional conception of democracy advocates for the representation of diversity, i.e., the full spectrum of positions in the society. The majoritarian conception stresses that politicians respond to the will of the majority of their electoral district.
We believe it is useful to distinguish two dimensions of analysis in this debate. 
SUPPELENTARY MATERIAL
A Quasi-Natural Experiment on Electoral Rules and Political
Representation
This Supplement contains all the results discussed, but not presented, in the main text.
Theoretical Analysis: Extension to Two Policy Dimensions and Multiple Parties
Consider an electoral district inhabited by voters, divided in four groups ( , , and Thus, all theoretical results presented in the manuscript generalize to two dimensions and four parties. Indeed, for the Lower House, our theoretical results are general, as we can apply the exact same logic to any number of groups and policy dimensions.
For the Upper House the analysis is more complicated because MPs are elected using a majoritarian electoral rule. Thus, for minority voters it might not make sense to vote for their party if such vote is a complete waste. In order to deal with this issue, we assume that electoral competition for the Upper House concentrates between the two parties that represent the two largest group of voters in the district measured by � , �. The idea is that minority voters know that their party has no chance of winning the election and, hence, they decide to vote for the majority party closer to their preferences. This leads to two possible 1 Similarly, if < , then an -representative and an -representative will accept any proposal ∈ �2 − , �. Indeed, party will win the election and, therefore, all the seats of the district in the Upper voters constitute a majority of the voters in the district. In conclusion, when the two largest groups are located along one policy dimension, for any legislative proposal, the decision made by the district representatives in the Upper House will be aligned with the preferences of a majority of the voters in the district.
Suppose that the two largest groups of voters differ in both policy dimensions. Without loss of generality, assume that the largest groups are and (formally, Supplement Upper House representatives might not be aligned with is bounded from above by: proportionally elected politicians in specification (1) and remains similar compared to Table   1 in the manuscript for majority-elected politicians. Thus, for small districts, the proportional electoral rule tends to converge to the majoritarian rule. In specifications (3) and (4) we focus on a subsample of referenda where both, the majority of voters of nation and the majority of voters in a district, either accept or reject the decision such that the preferences are aligned.
We observe that the coefficient magnitudes are almost identical to the Table 1 . We observe that the coefficients for the variable Voter yes share is quantitatively almost identical to those presented in Table 1 , specification (1) and (4) in the manuscript. Figure S.1 illustrates the now common pattern of differences between the proportional and the majoritarian rule. Specification (1) and (4) of Table S .2 account for random effects for referenda and districts, specifications (2) and (6) account for random effects for referenda and MPs, and finally specifications (3) and (6) additionally add district and party fixed effects.
The coefficient of the variable Voter yes share changes only marginally over the specifications for the respective electoral rules. 
Establishing Differences between Proportional and Majoritarian Rules
Panel (a) of Table S .3 provides empirical evidence that the impact of the Voter yes share is statistically different, depending on the electoral rule. As stated in the manuscript, we merge the dataset for proportionally and majority-elected MPs, employ an identifier for proportionally-elected MPs and interact this identifier with Voter yes share. The coefficient of efficient of the interaction term is statistically significant and negative. This also holds when splitting the sample at the 50% threshold. Thus, the curvature of the predicted probabilities from the logit model is smaller for proportionally-elected politicians than for majority-elected ones. Put differently, the relationship between the Voter yes share and the probability that an MP votes yes, increases significantly more for majority-elected MPs compared to proportionally-elected MPs around the 50% threshold. p=0.0000 (Proportional > Majoritarian) Notes: ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively. Logit models are estimated and robust standard errors are reported.
Panel (b) of Table S .3 provides Kolmogorow-Smirnow tests for the equality of the empirical distributions of Figure 1 (a) in the manuscript. All these tests always reject the equality of the distributions implied by proportional and majoritarian rules even when drawing only 100 observations. Table S .4 provides the coefficient estimates for the Figure 5 in the manuscript. The discussion of these estimations is done in the manuscript. In Table S .5 we estimate a linear probability models (OLS) of Table S (1) and (2) implying a 1-to-1 relationship between the Voter yes share and MP votes yes for proportionally-elected politicians (corresponding to theory). The relationship is with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.4658 somewhat lower for the sample of observations where the Voter yes share is above 65%. For majority elected politicians we do not observe a statistically significant relationship between the Voter yes share and MP votes yes for the subsamples where the Voter yes share is below 35% (specification 4) or above 65% (specification 6) corresponding to our theoretical considerations. If the Voter yes share lies beteen 35% and 65% (specification 5), we observe a positive statistically significant coefficient which is even statistically significantly larger than 1. Thus, for majority-elected politicians an increase in the Voter yes share close to the 50% benchmark is associated with a more than proportional increase on in the probability of an MP to vote yes in the Upper House. Figure S .4, we predict how different changes in the Voter yes share are associated with changes in the probability of an MP to vote yes for proportionally and majority-elected MPs.
Differences between Empirical Distributions and Theoretical Ideal Outcomes
The prediction is based on the estimations presented in Table 1 , specifications (1) and (4).
For the proportional rule any percentage point change in the Voter yes share is closely associated with the same quantitative change in the probability of an MP to vote yes, e.g. a Supplement change in the Voter yes share from 35 to 45% is associated with a change in the probability to of an MP to vote yes by about 10%-points. In contrast, only when approaching the 50% threshold, the association becomes strong for the majoritarian rule, e.g. when changing the Voter yes share from 10 to 35%, the change in the probability of an MP to vote yes is about 15%-points but with a high standard error, while changing the Voter yes share from 45 to 55% is associated with a change in the probability of an MP to vote yes by about 30%-points.
This figure closely corresponds to the results of Figure 1(b) in the manuscript where changes in the Voter yes share of 1%-points are represented.
